Abstract. This paper presents experimental results from an analysis of two similar games, the repeated ultimatum game and the repeated best-shot game. The experiment examines whether the amount and content of information given to players a¨ects the evolution of play in the two games. In one experimental treatment, subjects in both games observe not only their own actions and payo¨s, but also those of one randomly chosen pair of players in the just-completed round of play. In the other treatment, subjects in both games observe only their own actions and payo¨s. We present evidence suggesting that observation of other players' actions and payo¨s may a¨ect the evolution of play relative to the case of no observation.
Introduction
There is now a large experimental literature that examines learning behavior in repeated non-cooperative games. The kind of learning behavior that has been examined in these experiments has been mainly limited to cases where individuals learn on the basis of their own past experience. A more general analysis of learning behavior would consider whether providing players with additional information a¨ects the evolution of play over time. In particular, one might ask whether changes in the content and quantity of information available to players a¨ects the rate at which they learn to play equilibrium strategies. This paper takes a ®rst step toward addressing these kinds of questions.
We examine the e¨ect of additional information on learning in an experiment involving two similar games, the repeated``ultimatum game'' and the repeated``best-shot game.'' An experimental comparison of these two games was previously conducted by Prasnikar and Roth (1992) . Our experiment consists of two treatments. In the ®rst treatment, subjects are informed of only their own actions and payo¨s. This treatment is similar to one found in the Prasnikar and Roth (1992) study as well as in many other experimental implementations of repeated non-cooperative games. The second treatment is more novel. In this treatment, subjects are informed of their own actions and payo¨s as well as the actions and payo¨s of one randomly chosen pair of players in the justcompleted round of play. We use these two treatments to examine whether observation of other players' actions and payo¨s a¨ects the evolution of play relative to the (standard) case where observation of others is not possible.
From a game-theoretic perspective, allowing for observation of how another pair of players play the game is a step in the direction of satisfying the``mutual knowledge of the strategy choices'' condition, which, given that players play rationally according to the payo¨structure of the game, is su½cient to ensure that players play according to the equilibrium predictions of game theory (Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) ). Thus, one might suppose that when players are allowed to observe the actions and payo¨s of others, they will learn more quickly to play in accordance with the game's equilibrium predictions relative to the case where players do not get to observe the actions and payo¨s of others.
The notion that individuals may learn by observing the actions of others is one that economists have only recently begun to recognize.1 Anthropologists, however, have long noted that in many cultures, observation is the primary method through which individuals learn. Reichard (1938) , for example, has observed that in many languages``the word for`teach' is the same as the word for`show,' and the synonymity is literal.''2 Among behavioral psychologists, the hypothesis that individuals learn through observation of others is also well established. Bandura and Walters (1963) , summarizing a large body of experimental research, conclude that there are three main e¨ects of observation on learning behavior. First, the observer may learn through observation to play new strategies that were previously unknown. Second, the observer may learn through observation to become less phobic about playing certain inhibitory strategies. Third, observation of others may facilitate the play of strategies the observer already knows, but has a low probability of playing.
In this study, we focus on this third e¨ect of observation. We imagine that when players observe strategies resulting in high payo¨s, they are more likely to adopt the observed strategy in subsequent rounds of play. We develop an adaptive learning algorithm based on one proposed by Roth and Erev (1995) that incorporates our assumption about how players use the additional information they receive about other players. We use this algorithm to simulate how play might evolve in our experimental treatments with and without observation. The simulations suggest that the e¨ect of observation on learning behavior is di¨erent in the two games. In the ultimatum game, players who observe the actions and payo¨s of other players tend to move further from the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction over time, relative to players who do not observe the actions and payo¨s of others. In the best-shot game, players who observe the actions and payo¨s of others tend to move closer toward the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction over time relative to players who do not observe the actions and payo¨s of others.
The predictions of our adaptive learning model are tested in an experiment with human subjects. We ®nd that in the ultimatum game, players who observe the actions and payo¨s of other players do indeed tend to move further away from the subgame perfect equilibrium relative to players who do not observe the actions and payo¨s of others. By contrast, in the best-shot game, players who observe the actions and payo¨s of other players are only slightly, though not signi®cantly, closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction relative to players who do not observe the actions and payo¨s of others. Thus our results concerning the e¨ect of observation on learning are mixed and appear to be dependent upon the game played.
The games
The ®rst game we consider is the ultimatum bargaining game in which two players attempt to divide $10. Player 1 moves ®rst by proposing to keep a nonnegative integer amount $y`$10 for herself, leaving Player 2 the residual amount $10 À y.3 Player 2 must then decide whether to accept or reject Player 1's o¨er. If Player 2 accepts Player 1's o¨er, Player 2 receives the proposed o¨er of $10 À y, while Player 1 receives $y. If Player 2 rejects Player 1's o¨er, both players receive zero. While this game has many Nash equilibria, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for Player 1 to demand $9 and for Player 2 to accept this demand, thereby earning $1.
The second game we consider is the``best-shot'' public good game of Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) . Player 1 moves ®rst by choosing an integer investment amount i 1 e 0Y 9.4 Player 2 observes the investment amount 3 Note that these rules di¨er from the rules of other ultimatum game experiments in two respects. First, Player 1 proposals must be in discrete, even-dollar amounts. Second, Player 1s are not allowed to demand the entire $10 prize. We restrict Player 1s to making even-dollar demands as a means of narrowing the strategy space and making it comparable to the discrete strategy space of the best-shot game; the same restricted strategy space was used in our simulations. We do not allow Player 1's to demand the entire $10 prize to ensure that the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique.
chosen by Player 1, and then also chooses an integer investment amount i 2 e 0Y 9. The project level (the amount of the public good actually furnished) is Q maxi 1 Y i 2 . Once the project level is determined, each player k receives payo¨Q41 À Qa20 À 1X65 Â i k .5 Note that Player 2's best response to a zero investment by Player 1 is an investment of 4, and Player 2's best response to a nonzero investment by Player 1 is an investment of 0. There are two Nash equilibrium outcomes: a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which Player 1 chooses to invest 0 and Player 2 chooses to invest 4, and a non-subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which Player 1 chooses to invest 4 and Player 2 chooses to invest 0.
Previous experimental results
In a number of controlled laboratory experiments of the ultimatum game, the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction has been soundly rejected.6 A typical ®nding is that Player 1s propose to split the money prize nearly equally and that Player 2s accept this proposal. Player 1s who propose to keep the bulk of the money prize for themselves ®nd that their proposals are often rejected by Player 2s, even though Player 2s always receive a higher monetary payob y accepting any positive o¨er from Player 1s. One explanation for the inconsistency of the experimental results with the theory is that players begin play with a prior disposition to play fairly; given some experience and/or additional information they might learn to play the subgame perfect outcome. This explanation, while appealing, is not completely satisfying; it does not o¨er much guidance as to what kind of experience or knowledge players must acquire or how long it will take players to become experienced or knowledgeable enough to play the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. Harrison and McCabe (1996) , for example, have noted that experimental tests of the ultimatum game ignore the theoretical assumption that players havè`c ommon knowledge'' of the beliefs, motives and strategies of all other players. However, their implementation of the common knowledge assumption comes at the cost of substantially altering the experimental design. Evidence from other experiments suggests that greater or more varied experience in playing the ultimatum game does not greatly a¨ect players' tendencies to deviate from the subgame perfect equilibrium (see, e.g. Gu È th, Schmittberger, and Schwarz (1982) , Bolton (1991) , or Roth et al. (1991) ).
In contrast, the Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) best-shot game experiment yielded results that were largely consistent with the subgame perfect outcome (cf. Harrison and Hirshleifer's experiment SQ-3). Prasnikar and Roth (1992) likelihood of negative payo¨s in the stage game. In both the Harrison-Hirshleifer payo¨tables and those we used, investment amounts above 8 are very likely to result in negative payo¨s. Since both Harrison-Hirshleifer and Prasnikar-Roth report few, if any, investment choices above 8, we conjectured that removing some of these choices would not signi®cantly alter the play of this game. 5 These parameters di¨er somewhat from those used by Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) ; for given investment levels, payo¨s are roughly twice what they would be in Harrison and Hirshleifer. We chose these numbers so that equilibrium payo¨s in the ultimatum game and best-shot game are of approximately the same magnitude. The numbers we use preserve both the Nash equilibria and the best-response correspondence of Harrison and Hirshleifer. 6 See Roth (1995) or Gu È th and Tietz (1990) for surveys. repeated the Harrison-Hirshleifer best-shot game experiment, but gave players`f ull information'' about each other's payo¨functions, in contrast to Harrison and Hirshleifer, who did not explicitly tell subjects that they shared the same payo¨function. Prasnikar and Roth found that this change in available information did not signi®cantly a¨ect the outcome of the game; players with full information also chose actions that were very close to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction.
Prasnikar and Roth concluded that the di¨erence in outcomes between the best-shot and ultimatum games could be attributed to di¨erences in o¨-the-equilibrium-path incentives. They observed that Player 1s in the ultimatum game do better in terms of expected payo¨(given the observed distribution of Player 2 responses to particular Player 1 actions) by deviating further from the subgame perfect equilibrium (up to a point). In contrast, in the best-shot game, Player 1s do worse in terms of expected payo¨by deviating further from the subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence, convergence to equilibrium is much more likely in the best-shot game than in the ultimatum game, regardless of whether players in the best-shot game have full information about payo¨s.
Observation of others
With the exception of the study by Harrison and McCabe (1996) , the experimental studies that we have discussed all envision that players learn using only their own past history of play. We now consider the possibility that players can observe the actions and payo¨s of another pair of players. In particular, we want to consider versions of the ultimatum and best-shot games where, after seeing their own actions and payo¨s, each matched pair of players is able to observe the actions and payo¨s of one randomly chosen pair of players in the just-completed round of play. We refer to these versions of the ultimatum and best-shot games as versions with observation. Games in which players observe only their own history of play will be referred to as versions without observation.
The restriction on observation to a single pair of players is intended to minimize the potential for strategic actions aimed at reputation-building. In particular, Player 2s in both games may seek to form``tough'' reputations as a means of obtaining more favorable treatment from Player 1s, who move ®rst. In the ultimatum game, Player 2s build reputations by rejecting proposals that give them low payo¨s. In the best-shot game, Player 2s build reputations by responding to low Player 1 investment amounts with low investment amounts of their own. Reputation-building in both games is a consequence of the repeated nature of the games and of the information that players receive. While reputation-building is possible in both treatments, it may be more prevalent in sessions with observation since in these sessions, Player 2s know that their actions can be observed by two Player 1s rather than only one.
We begin our inquiry into the e¨ect of observation on learning behavior by conducting simulations using a version of Roth and Erev's (1995) reinforcement learning model in versions of the ultimatum and best-shot games with and without observation. The learning algorithm was modi®ed so that it was capable of processing information on observed actions and payo¨s as well as on player's own actions and payo¨s. We use the simulation results from this model to formulate some hypotheses that we later test in our experiment. We chose to use the Roth-Erev model because it has been successful in tracking the qualitative features of the behavior of subjects in experimental versions of the ultimatum and best-shot games without observation (Roth and Erev (1995) ) as well as for other games Roth (1998), Feltovich (1998) ), and also because it is the only learning model that has thus far been used for tracking behavior in these two games.
The learning model
The learning model can be described as follows. In round t, player i has a propensity q ij t 0 to play her j th pure strategy from a set of n possible pure strategies. The probability that she plays the j th pure strategy in round t 1, p ij t, is determined by these propensities:
In every round t, each player is randomly matched with a player of the opposite type and chooses a strategy according to his or her probabilities. When observation of other players is allowed, each pair of players is randomly matched with another pair of players, with all pairings being equally likely. The strategies of a player and her opponent determine their payo¨s, and these payo¨s are used to update the players' propensities for round t 1. When there is observation, players also update their propensities to play the strategies of the players they have observed. Suppose in round t, the ith Player 1 plays strategy j resulting in payoö i t and observes that the i H th Player 1 plays strategy j H resulting in payoö i H t. Her propensities are updated as follows:
where 0 is the weight placed on observed payo¨s. Thus Player 1s treat observed outcomes similarly to own outcomes, but give them times as much weight. This is meant to capture the idea that ®rsthand experience usually takes precedence over secondhand experience. There is no updating of propensities to play strategies that were neither chosen nor observed in round t. Initial (t 0) propensities are assumed to be exogenously given. In modeling how Player 2s update their propensities, we must make assumptions as to how strategies are inferred from observed actions. When a Player 2 observes the action a 2 of another Player 2, he also observes the action a 1 of the Player 1 matched to that Player 2. Thus, each Player 2 knows the set of strategies that could possibly have been played by the observed Player 2, given the observed action pro®le a a 1 Y a 2 . Let fj
n g be the set of possible strategies given a. We assume that
This inference technique is consistent with Bayes' rule combined with the assumption that simulated Player 2s act as though they all have the same mixed strategy. Now suppose that in round t the ith Player 2 plays strategy j resulting in payo¨o i t and observes that the action pro®le a results in the payo¨o i H t. His propensities are updated as follows:
for all j H that are possible given a. Setting 0 gives us the learning model for the no-observation case, which is the one originally proposed by Roth and Erev (1995) .
Application to the ultimatum and best-shot games
For our ultimatum game simulations, we use the set f0Y F F F Y 9g of possible demands as the pure strategy set for Player 1s. Theoretically, the Player 2 strategy set in the ultimatum game is the set of all functions mapping the set of demands into the set of responses {Accept, Reject}, but we follow Roth and Erev (1995) in limiting the Player 2 strategy set to``threshold'' strategies of the form:``accept demands of j or less, and reject demands of more than j,'' for some integer j e f0Y F F F Y 9g. The subgame perfect equilibrium is 9Y 9. Given an observed outcome of ( j, Accept), the set of possible Player 2 strategies is fk j k jg, and given an observed outcome of ( j, Reject), the set of possible Player 2 strategies is fk j k`jg.
For our best-shot game simulations, we use the set of investment levels f0Y F F F Y 4g as the pure strategy set for Player 1s. In our experiment with human subjects we allow Player 1s to choose investment amounts greater than 4. However, we noted that in both the Prasnikar-Roth and Harrison-Hirshleifer best-shot experiments, players very rarely chose investment amounts greater than 4. Because the Player 2 strategy set is large, even after we reduce the number of Player 1 strategies to just 5, we reduce the number of Player 2 strategies by restricting investment choices to the set f0Y F F F Y 4g and by further restricting Player 2 strategies so that a pure strategy is characterized by how it responds to a Player 1 investment of 0 and how it responds to Player 1 investment amounts that are greater than 0. This results in Player 2s having 25 available pure strategies of the form``Respond to 0 with k 1 and to 1, 2, 3, or 4 with k 2 .'' Given an observed outcome of 0Y m, the set of Player 2 strategies is fmY kj k e f0Y F F F Y 4gg, and given an observed outcome of jY m for j 1, the set of Player 2 strategies is fkY mj k e f0Y F F F Y 4gg.
Simulation results
We conducted 400 simulations, 100 each of the ultimatum game with and without observation and 100 each of the best-shot game with and without observation. Each simulation was run for 200 rounds and corresponds to an experimental session involving 6 Player 1s and 6 Player 2s. We estimated initial propensities from observed actions in previous experiments: we used the ®rst-round play reported in Prasnikar and Roth's (1992) best-shot game with complete information for all of our best-shot simulations and we used the ®rst-round play reported in Roth et al.'s (1991) (Pittsburgh) ultimatum game for all of our ultimatum game simulations. We set 0X5 in all of our simulations involving observation. Figure 1 shows mean Player 1 demands in the two ultimatum cells (left panel) and mean Player 1 investment amounts in the two best-shot cells (right panel), in both cases averaged over all 100 simulations. We see that observation has opposite e¨ects in the two games. In the ultimatum game, mean Player 1 demands are further from the subgame perfect equilibrium with observation than without observation, while in the best-shot game, mean Player 1 investment amounts are closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium with observation than without observation. Moreover, the di¨erences in play between the observation and no-observation treatments persist over many rounds, particularly in the ultimatum game.7
The di¨erence that we observe between the e¨ect of observation in the ultimatum game simulations and in the best-shot game simulations is due to di¨erences in incentive structures o¨the equilibrium path. Recall that Prasnikar and Roth (1992) found that for``typical'' distributions of Player 2 responses in ultimatum game experiments, o¨-the-equilibrium-path payo¨s are such that Player 1s earn higher payo¨s by deviating from subgame perfect play, while in best-shot game experiments, o¨-the-equilibrium-path payo¨s are such that Player 1s earn higher payo¨s by playing more in line with subgame perfect play. Since we initialized the learning algorithm using``typical'' Player 2 play, the o¨-the-equilibrium-path incentive structure is main- Fig. 1 . Simulation predictions 7 Our simulation results are robust to changes in the value of our imitation parameter, , which we set equal to .5. We can think of our simulation results for games without observation as corresponding to a choice of 0. In some further simulations (not reported above) we considered 10 additional values of ; 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, and 1.5. We found that in the ultimatum game, as increases, mean demands move away from the subgame perfect equilibrium more quickly. Similarly, for the best-shot game, as increases, mean Player 1 investments move closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium more quickly. Thus we conclude that our simulation predictions are robust to changes in the value of , the imitation parameter. tained in our simulations, and thus deviations from subgame perfect play result in higher payo¨s (and more reinforcement) in the ultimatum game than subgame perfect play, while they result in lower payo¨s (and less reinforcement) in the best-shot game than subgame perfect play. In ultimatum game simulations with observation, deviations from subgame perfect play are rewarded not only for the player who deviated, but also for the observing player. Thus, the probability and extent of deviation from subgame perfect play become higher even more quickly when we allow for observation of others. In best-shot game simulations with observation, deviations from subgame perfect play are punished not only for the player who deviated, but also for the observing player. Thus, the probability and extent of deviation from subgame perfect play become lower even more quickly when we allow for observation of others.
Hypotheses
Based on our simulations, we hypothesize that allowing observation of the actions and payo¨s of another pair of players will have opposite e¨ects on behavior over time in the ultimatum and best-shot games. We focus on the behavior of Player 1s, as their strategies are readily observable from their actions. We hypothesize that: (1) Player 1 demands in the ultimatum game with observation will be further from subgame perfect equilibrium demands (i.e., lower) than Player 1 demands in the ultimatum game without observation; (2) Player 1 investment amounts in the best-shot game with observation will be closer to subgame perfect equilibrium investment amounts (i.e., lower) than Player 1 investment amounts in the best-shot game without observation.
Our ®rst hypothesis runs counter to the claim that deviations from subgame perfect equilibrium behavior are due to players' lack of information. Here we predict that giving players in the ultimatum game more information ± a step in the direction of satisfying the mutual knowledge assumption discussed in the introduction ± actually increases the degree of deviation from the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction! On the other hand, our second hypothesis re¯ects the common (game-theoretic) wisdom that giving players more information in the best-shot game leads to play closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction.
Experimental design
We used a 2 Â 2 experimental design. The two treatment variables were 1) the game played, ultimatum or best-shot, and 2) observation or no observation. We ran three sessions of each of the four experimental cells. Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population at the University of Pittsburgh. Copies of the instructions used in the experiment are available from the authors upon request.
At the beginning of an experimental session, subjects were randomly assigned the role of Player 1 or Player 2; roles remained unchanged for the duration of the session. In each round of a game, each player was randomly and anonymously paired with a player of the opposite type. After players were paired, Player 1s made and veri®ed their moves. Player 2s observed the moves of their opponents and then made and veri®ed their moves. Then all players were shown their own moves, their opponents' moves, their own payo¨s, and their opponents' payo¨s. In cells without observation, the next round would begin after all players had pressed a key to continue. In cells with observation, after all players had pressed the key, each pair of players was shown the actions and payo¨s of another pair of players, where the observed pairs were assigned as described in section 3.1. After observing these actions and payo¨s, players were prompted to press a key to continue. When all players had pressed this key, the next round of play began.
Sessions consisted of 40 rounds of the ultimatum game, or 30 rounds of the best-shot game. (Best-shot games proceeded more slowly). Subjects were not told how many rounds would be played, but they did know that the session would not exceed 90 minutes. Following the last round, one round was randomly chosen by the computer program, and subjects were paid their earnings in that round in addition to a $10.00 participation fee. Average total earnings for subjects in the ultimatum cells were $14.52 for Player 1s and $13.34 for Player 2s; average total earnings for subjects in the best-shot cells were $13.02 for Player 1s and $12.56 for Player 2s. Figure 2 shows mean demands of all Player 1s in the ultimatum cells over 5-round intervals. Mean demands in the ®rst 5 rounds are about $6.00 in both cells.8 In the no-observation sessions, mean demands increase by about 30 cents from the ®rst 5 to the second 5 rounds and then remain relatively constant while in the observation sessions, mean demands decrease steadily over time to just over $5.25 in the last 5 rounds. The mean demands illustrated in Figure 2 are also reported in the second and third columns of Table 2 . The last two columns of this table report 1-sided robust rank-order test statistics (denoted by U Á ) and p-values for di¨erences in the distributions of demands between the observation and no-observation sessions for each group of 5 rounds and for all 40 rounds.9 Looking at the tests, we see that with the exception of the ®rst and fourth 5-round periods, we can reject the null hypothesis of no di¨erence between the observation and no-observation sessions in favor of the alternative that Player 1 demands are lower in the observation sessions. Thus we ®nd support for our hypothesis regarding the e¨ect of observation on behavior in the ultimatum game. We further ®nd that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no change over time in mean demands in the no-observation cell, but we can reject this same null hypothesis for mean demands in the observation cell, in favor of the Fig. 2 . Ultimatum game ± mean player 1 demands 9 We use the robust rank-order test instead of the more commonly used Mann-Whitney test because the Mann-Whitney test assumes that the samples come from distributions with identical second (dispersion) and higher-order moments, whereas the robust rank-order test makes no such assumption. See Siegel and Castellan (1988) . Because the session-level data consist of only six observations for each test, we must use the small-sample distribution of U Á rather than the normal approximation. We are thus constrained to using only two signi®cance levels ± .10 and .05 ± rather than the near-continuum available for the normal approximation (see Fligner and Policello (1981) ). Of course, more session level data would help to alleviate this problem. Our session-level tests can therefore be viewed as rather severe tests for di¨erences between treatments.
Experimental results

Ultimatum game results ± player 1 behavior
alternative hypothesis that mean demands do change over time (Page test for ordered alternatives, p e X01). In addition to examining di¨erences between treatments using pooled session-level data, we also made use of the individual-level data consisting of the unpooled individual observations on Player 1 demands in all sessions. Using this individual level data from all sessions, we estimated an OLS regression model for Player 1 demands.10 The estimated equation is:
Session Dummy i and the adjusted R 2 was 0.2567. The Observation dummy is 1 in sessions with observation and 0 otherwise. Round is the current round number in the session (1±40). The Round Â Observation Dummy variable is just the product of the round variable and the observation dummy; this variable is intended to capture time-varying e¨ects of allowing for observation of other players. Finally, we included session dummies to control for possible di¨erences across sessions; to save space we have suppressed the coe½cient estimates on these session dummies. One can see from the standard errors on the coe½cient estimates (given in parentheses) that with the exception of the coe½cient on Round, all of the coe½cient estimates in the above regression model are signi®cantly di¨erent from zero at the .01 level. We conclude that there is support for the notion that observation of others a¨ects the evolution of Player 1 demands.
Finally, we examine the e¨ect that observation has on disaggregated Player 1 behavior. Recall that in our simulations, we assumed that players updated their propensities for playing observed actions as well as own actions based on the payo¨s they received and the payo¨s they observed. We now examine whether Player 1s in the experimental sessions used the extra information given them in the observation cell, and if so, how they used it. To assess the e¨ect of observation on individual play, we categorize our sample of Player 1s according to their own outcomes and then examine whether their next-round actions vary with the outcomes they observed in the previous round. In particular, we focus on Player 1 actions in rounds following own outcomes of (1) an accepted 50±50 split, (2) an accepted 60±40 split, and (3) a rejected 60±40 split. These outcomes account for approximately 87% of all outcomes in all rounds of the ultimatum sessions with observation. For each own outcome, we then examine the extent to which Player 1 actions in the following round 10 We acknowledge that our use of econometric methods to analyze individual-level data may not be completely valid due to the lack of independence among the individual data; within a particular session, the play of di¨erent individuals in a particular round cannot be regarded as consisting of independent observations because the individuals may have interacted with one another before, or may have interacted with the same other players in previous rounds. This problem is further exacerbated in our observation cells. The lack of independence greatly increases the likelihood of Type I error in our hypothesis tests. Thus, our econometric results must be viewed with some caution. We note, however, that in all cases, our regression results using individual-level data serve only to con®rm (and do not detract from) the ®ndings of our nonparametric tests based on session-level data which do consist of independent observations. are correlated with observed outcomes. We consider observed outcomes of (a) an accepted 60±40 split, and (b) a rejected 60±40 split. Table 3a reports, for each possible pairing of these own and observed outcomes, the relative frequency of Player 1s who chose to demand 60% or more of the prize in the next round of play. We see that Player 1s whose demand of 60% was accepted in the current round are substantially more likely to demand 60% or more of the prize in the next round after observing an accepted 60±40 split than after observing a rejected 60±40 split in the current round. That is, Player 1s appear to be taking the observed information into account when choosing actions in later periods.
One may wonder whether the apparent correlation between observed outcomes and future actions in Table 3a is due to the additional information players receive, or to some other phenomenon. We sought to determine whether the correlations were spurious by examining similar relative frequencies for the ultimatum game sessions without observation. We randomly assigned all Player 1s in each round of each session without observation to another Player 1 in the same round of the same session. We used the same assignment algorithm that we used in our experimental sessions with observation. We then treated the assigned Player 1s as if they were``observed'' Player 1s. In Table 3b , we report the mean and standard error of the probabilities (corresponding to those in Table 3a ) that we obtained from repeating this exercise 100 times. If the correlations observed in Table 3a are due to some phenomenon unrelated to the presence of observation, we would expect to see similar correlations in Table 3b . Similar correlations are not observed; there are no substantial di¨erences between elements in each row of Table 3b . Thus it appears that the correlations seen in Table 3a really are due to Player 1s taking the observed information into account when choosing strategies for the next round.
Ultimatum game results ± player 2 behavior
We have suggested that the di¨erences in behavior between Player 1s in the observation and no-observation cells may be explained by the presence of observation in the former. An alternative explanation is that Player 1s are merely reacting to the actions of Player 2s who are behaving di¨erently in the two cells. Many experimenters have sought to explain Player 1 behavior in the ultimatum game by examining how well Player 1 actions correspond to best responses to the historical frequency distribution of Player 2 actions.11 Figure  3 shows, for both ultimatum game cells, the relative frequencies with which Player 2s accept Player 1 demands of 50%, 60%, and 70% of the prize over 5 round intervals.12 The principal di¨erence in Player 2 behavior between the two cells appears to be in their responses to proposed 70±30 splits. In the no-observation cell, proposals for 70±30 splits are accepted more than half the time in the ®rst 5 rounds, and the frequency of acceptance increases to over 80% in the last 30 rounds. Nevertheless, using robust rank order tests on frequency data at the session level, we are unable to ®nd statistically signi®cant di¨erences in acceptance rates for Player 2s facing 70±30 proposals between the observation and no-observation treatments. The same ®nding also holds for Player 2s facing 50±50 and 60±40 proposals, again using robust rank-order tests on frequency data at the session level.
11 See, e.g., Roth et al. (1991) . 12 In the third panel of Figure 3 , frequency values of 0 for a given 5-round period do not imply the absence of Player 1 demands of 70%. Rather, they indicate that Player 2s rejected all 70±30 proposals they faced. Since the session level data do not reveal any signi®cant di¨erences in Player 2 behavior across treatments, we also examined the individual-level Player 2 data using probit analysis. The dependent variable, Accept, is the Player 2's decision of whether to accept 1 or reject 0 a particular Player 1 proposal. We considered Player 2 responses to all Player 1 demands as well as to Player 1 demands of 60% and 70%. The model we estimated is: Here, the Round variable, the Observation dummy, the Round Â Observation variable and the Session dummies are the same as in the Player 1 regressions reported in section 5.1. The Player 1 Demand variable is the proposal that the Player 2 faced. In those cases where we focus on a particular type of Player 1 proposal, this variable is omitted as a regressor. The regression results are presented in Table 4 .13 We see that in all cases, the coe½cient estimate on the Round Â Observation Dummy term is negative and signi®cant at the .10 level suggesting that over time, the probability that Player 2s accept Player 1 demands is decreasing in the observation treatments as compared with the no observation treatments. We also see that the coe½cient estimate on the observation dummy by itself is also negative and signi®cant at the .10 level for the regressions involving all Player 1 demands and Player 1 demands of 70%. Thus we ®nd some evidence that the probability a Player 2 accepts a given
13 To save space we have again suppressed the coe½cient estimates on the dummy terms. Player 1 demand is lower in certain cases in the observation treatment compared with the no-observation treatment. This lower probability of acceptance in the observation treatment may have a¨ected Player 1 demands. Given the frequencies with which Player 1 proposals are accepted by Player 2s the optimal Player 1 demand ± the demand that maximizes expected monetary payo¨± is typically lower in the observation cells than in the no-observation cells.14 Since there is essentially no di¨erence between Player 2 initial behavior (in the ®rst 5 rounds) in the observation and no-observation cells, we conclude that changes over time in Player 2 behavior di¨er between the observation and no-observation cells, and that this di¨erence may help explain the di¨erences in Player 1 learning behavior.15 5.3. Best-shot game ± player 1 results Figure 4 shows mean Player 1 investment amounts in the best-shot game cells over 5-round periods. We see that these investment amounts follow similar paths, both starting above 3, dropping o¨quickly over the ®rst 10 rounds, 14 In two of the three ultimatum sessions with observation, the optimal demand is 5 in all 5-round periods; in the other session, the optimal demand is 6 in all 5-round periods. In two of the three sessions without observation, the optimal demand varies between 5 and 6; in the other session, the optimal demand is 6 in the ®rst two 5-round periods and 7 in the last six 5-round periods. In all sessions, Player 1 expected revenues decline weakly monotonically as demands move in either direction from the optimum. 15 It is also of interest to consider whether Player 2s in our ultimatum game experiments are foregoing signi®cant payo¨amounts in their rejection of positive o¨ers by Player 1s. If Player 2s perceive that the monetary stakes are low, they may (rationally) refuse to employ much e¨ort in assessing how to play the game. (For a further discussion of this subject, see e.g. Harstad and Marrese (1982) for public good games, or Ho¨man, McCabe and Smith (1996) for ultimatum games.) In our ultimatum games without observation, the total amount foregone each round by Player 2s averaged 15.7% of expected earnings per round (given Player 1 proposals) while in sessions with observation the total amount foregone each round averaged 19% of expected earnings per round (given Player 1 proposals). and then remaining approximately constant over the last 15 rounds, near the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction of 0.16 In fact, the modal Player 1 investment amount is 0 in all 5-round periods of the observation cell, and in all 5-round periods except the ®rst in the no-observation cell. We also observe that in every 5-round period, Player 1 investment amounts are somewhat closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction of 0 in the observation cell than in the no-observation cell, consistent with our hypothesis regarding behavior in the best-shot game.
However, according to robust rank-order tests reported in Table 5 , the observed di¨erences in investment amounts between the two treatments are not signi®cant p b X10, except in the ®rst 5 rounds. The observed decrease over time in mean Player 1 investment amounts in the no-observation cell is signi®cant (Page test for ordered alternatives, p e X005); however, it is only marginally signi®cant in the observation cell (Page test for ordered alternatives, p e X1). We conclude that Player 1s in both cells quickly learn to play close to the subgame perfect equilibrium and that there is little support for our hypothesis that observation leads Player 1s in the best-shot game to adopt strategies closer to the subgame perfect prediction.
An OLS regression serves to con®rm that observation of others does not signi®cantly a¨ect Player 1 behavior. Our estimated model of Player 1 investment is:
Session Dummy i
16 These initial investment levels are almost twice as high as those found by Harrison and Hirschleifer (1989) and by Prasnikar and Roth (1992) . This di¨erence may be due to the repeated nature of our game versus the one-shot nature of the earlier experiments. It is also worth noting that Harrison and Hirschleifer conducted only one sequential best-shot session and Prasnikar and Roth conducted only two; therefore, it may not yet be clear what initial conditions one should expect to ®nd in a best-shot experiment. The adjusted R 2 is 0.1893. Here the Round and Observation variables are as in the ultimatum game regressions. We have also included variables based on a quadratic trend term, Round 2 to account for the possibility of nonlinear changes in Player 1 investment levels over time. We see from the standard errors on the coe½cient estimates (given in parentheses), that the coe½cients on variables involving the observation dummy are never signi®cantly di¨erent from zero. On the other hand, the Round and Round 2 terms are signi®cantly di¨erent from zero; the negative coe½cient on Round and the positive coe½cient on Round 2 indicate that Player 1 investment levels decrease over time at a decreasing rate. We conclude that there is no support for our hypothesis that observation a¨ects the evolution of Player 1 investments. Player 1s in both treatments learn at about the same rate to play near the subgame perfect strategy.
Furthermore, Player 1s in the best-shot game do not appear to be in¯u-enced by di¨erences in payo¨s between own and observed actions. In contrast to the ultimatum game, we ®nd no strong correlation between best-shot game payo¨s (own or observed) and next-round actions using an analysis similar to the one we conducted for the ultimatum game (as reported in Tables 3a±  3b) .17 Since we assumed in our simulations that Player 1s are in¯uenced by such di¨erences in payo¨s, it is not surprising that the predictions of our bestshot simulations were not borne out in the experimental data.
5.4. Best-shot game ± player 2 behavior Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of Player 2 behavior in the best-shot game over 5-round periods. The left panel shows Player 2s' mean response to nonzero investments by Player 1s. While Player 2s do not initially recognize that 0 is a best response to any nonzero investment by Player 1s, they begin to recognize this strategy after the ®rst few rounds, as the mean response to nonzero 17 We have therefore chosen not to report this analysis here. See Du¨y and Feltovich (1996) for details. Robust rank-order tests show no signi®cant di¨erences between cells in Player 2 responses to either zero or nonzero investment levels by Player 1s using session level data. Therefore, we again turned to an examination of the individual level Player 2 data using probit analysis. The dependent variable, Player 2 Investment, is the Player 2's decision of whether to invest a positive amount 1 or zero 0 in response to a particular Player 1 investment level. As in the aggregate data analysis, we considered responses to all Player 1 investment levels and to Player 1 investment levels of zero and nonzero amounts. The model we estimated is given as: The round and observation variables are similar to those used in the ultimatum game probit analysis. Note that in these regressions, we also include variables involving the square of the round number, Round 2 ; the purpose is to capture the possibility of very rapid, nonlinear changes in behavior over time. The Player 1 investment variable is the amount invested by the Player 1 that is matched with the Player 2. The regression results are presented in Table 6 . 19 We see from this table that in all three cases, the variables involving the observation dummies are never signi®cant; this ®nding is consistent with our tests for di¨erences in Player 2 behavior using the session-level data. Like the Player 1 regressions, we also see that the only signi®cant coe½cient estimates are associated with the round and round 2 terms; the negative sign on the round coe½cient and the positive sign on the round 2 coe½cient imply that Player 2's probability of investing a positive amount decreases over time at a decreasing rate. The deviation from subgame perfect play (in response to zero Player 1 investments) might be explained by reputation-building on the part of Player 2s. 20 We note that our Player 2 responses to zero investment amounts di¨er
18 The apparent increase in the last few rounds of the sessions with observation is the result of a few outliers; the median and modal responses are 0 in every 5-round period but the ®rst in both treatments.
19 To save space we have again suppressed the coe½cient estimates on the dummy terms. 20 See section 5.5.
from the game-theoretic best response of 4 and also from the mean responses observed by Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) and Prasnikar and Roth (1992) that were close to 4. These di¨erences might be explained by the repeatedgame nature of our experiment and the resulting incentives for reputationbuilding that are not present in the experiments of Harrison-Hirshleifer and Prasnikar-Roth. However, while Player 2s do not always respond optimally (in terms of monetary payo¨) to Player 1 actions, they do play close enough to their monetary best responses that the optimal Player 1 investment in almost every 5-round period is zero.21 Given this Player 2 behavior, a Player 1's payo¨from investing zero is always much greater than her payo¨from investing a positive amount. Thus, even in the early rounds, Player 1s face a strong incentive to play the subgame perfect strategy.22
Reputation-building
We have noted that the e¨ect of increased information on Player 1 behavior may be complicated by the fact that Player 2s know that this information is 21 In one of the sessions with observation, the optimal Player 1 investment is 4 in three of the six 5-round periods. In one of the sessions without observation, the optimal Player 1 investment is 1 in one 5-round period and 3 in another. In all other 5-round periods (31 out of 36), the optimal Player 1 investment is zero. Unlike the ultimatum game sessions, a Player 1's expected revenues do not decrease monotonically as investments move away from the optimum. In particular, as Player 1s increase their investments up from zero, their expected revenues decline sharply, but then rise to a local maximum around 4, before declining once again for investment levels in excess of 4. 22 We note again (cf. footnote 15) the amounts foregone on average each round by Player 2s were 21.7% of expected earnings per round in sessions without observation and 24% of expected earnings per round in sessions with observation (given Player 1 investment levels). being provided, and may recognize and act upon the increased incentive to establish a reputation of``toughness'' in treatments with observation relative to those without observation. In Du¨y and Feltovich (1996) , we look for evidence of such reputation building by examining certain types of behavior by Player 2s in observation and no observation cells. While we ®nd evidence that suggests Player 2s seek to build tough reputations in both cells, the evidence also suggests that there is not much of a di¨erence in the incidence of reputation-building by Player 2s in the observation cells as compared with the noobservation cells. This ®nding is not too surprising, since the incentives for reputation building in the observation cells are not all that much greater than in the no-observation cells; players in the observation cells only get to observe the actions and payo¨s of one pair of players.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the e¨ect of additional information on learning in the ultimatum and best-shot games. In one treatment we allowed pairs of players to observe, prior to choosing their own actions, the actions and payo¨s of one other pair of players in the just completed round of play. We have compared and contrasted the results from this treatment with results from the standard treatment in which observation of other players is not allowed, and found that there were some di¨erences in the results. Our main ®nding is that increasing the quantity of information available to players need not hasten the rate at which players learn to play subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. In the ultimatum game, giving players additional information leads to play that is signi®cantly further from the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction relative to the case where players do not receive this additional information. In contrast, in the best-shot game, giving players additional information does not signi®cantly a¨ect the rate at which players learn to play subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. The reason for these di¨erent results lies in di¨erences in the content of the additional information that players receive. In the case of the ultimatum game with observation, Player 1s see that other Player 1s get higher payo¨s by deviating further from the subgame perfect strategy, and hence observation only reinforces this type of behavior. In the case of the best-shot game, the o¨-the-equilibrium path incentives are such that players do better by moving closer to subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. The incentive to play the equilibrium strategy in both treatments is so strong that players quickly react to this incentive on their own, so that additional information on how other players play the game is not as useful as it is in the ultimatum game, and does not signi®cantly a¨ect the manner in which players play the best-shot game. We conclude that the e¨ect of additional information on the evolution of play cannot be ascertained a priori; one must consider the content of the additional information as well.
